Abstract: The paper outlines the debate on European state socialism as a social and political order. There are different attempts to obtain a better understanding of the core principles of this type of society and a continuing public debate on it. Following the end of the decade of the transition from "socialism to capitalism" we can observe a renewal in the debates on the "Ancient regime" and its heritage. There are different reasons for this phenomenon; these include new insights from the archives and the recent politics on history in post-socialist societies. The new "zeitgeist" following the world financial crisis of 2008 might be an additional reason. The issues that developed are discussions on the nature of state socialism, some hypotheses on the role of reformers within the changes to late socialism from the perspective of political science, and some assumptions on the methods adopted by former reform socialists after 1989.
Introduction
Why is it necessary for political science to deal with state socialism, a system that became history more than two decades ago? What are the good reasons for that?
Another related question is: What is the difference between an historical view of history and a view from the perspective of political science? In my opinion the main difference consists in the fact that political science strives for a proper understanding of the functioning of present polities and politics. By contrast history seeks out historical events and turns and interpretations. We should not forget, however, that these interpretations of historical facts are in a sense inspired by present identities and interests as well.
The first point relating to political science's interest in former state socialism could be justified by the existence of clear "footprints" 2 of state socialism in Eastern Europe. This apparently concerns real and only imagined footprints: to list but three-the weakness of civil society in Eastern Europe; the economic difficulties after 1989 allegedly rooted in the previously nationalized economy; and, the overall influence of the old elites.
I have recently become interested in a particular footprint; namely, the post socialist legacy of reform socialism in the state parties of late socialism. In some countries this was weaker and in others it was stronger. I will return to the point of my interest after the introduction.
Another point could be that having a proper understanding of the political structure of the former society and how it functioned could be very helpful in grasping the general logic of a modern dictatorship anywhere. From the post-1989 changes it is clear that not only democracy but also dictatorships remained in the world of polities. State-socialist dictatorships were both lasting and stable so they could be an apt subject in the study of modern dictatorships. 3 The third point is that interpretations of history are used as an instrument in the ongoing political struggle. The "Politics of history" is a subject to found in both historical and political science analyses.
Fourthly, widespread post-socialist East European phenomena like nostalgia are not primarily produced by the influence of past experiences but by reflecting the present through a kind of utopia of the past. In his book on the nostalgic feelings for former Yugoslavia in present post-Yugoslavia Velikonja has detected that: "The Yugoslavia from the nostalgic discourse never existed. It is its utopian simulation, Yugoslavia as it should have been, a dreamland purified from all weaknesses and mistakes, a kind of socialist Cockaigne [or land of plenty: Schlaraffenland]" (2008, 133) .
Puzzling footprints -paradoxes as food for further thought
Before gaining experience of a certain subject we often command a specific concept of it. This concept may be rooted in past mainstream theoretical discussions, in hegemonic ideology, or in public prejudices. It is important therefore to perceive the difference between our initial expectations and the ensuing empirical findings. In this regard the unexpected is the most interesting. The-at least at first glance-paradoxical observations are topics requiring a closer look. In paradoxes there are many signs of ideologies and prejudices.
There are a considerable number of paradoxes regarding both late socialism and postsocialism 4 . I will list only some of them in order to provide food for further thought: 2 I owe the term "footprint of state socialism" to David Lane. He has written several books and articles on this topic (see, for instance, D. Lane 2000 and Geddes (2010, 4-27) and W. Merkel (ibid., [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] . 4 The term post-socialism was developed by ethnologists (See Hann 2002) . I am among those who have adopted it for discussions in political science (Segert 2007 ).
• The successor parties of the former communist state parties had become one of the strongest agents of neoliberal policies in post-socialist Eastern Europe; • If it is true that, depending on the respective form or kind of state socialism, reforms fare either better or worse, why is it that the most liberal version of socialism-namely that of Yugoslavia-has produced such ethnic violence, war and economic destruction? • And equally puzzling is: Why, just after 1989, did "Solidarność", the Polish trade union which had by far the strongest civil society network in Eastern Europe, accept a policy of societal transformation which clearly ran counter to some of the central interests of most of its members? Other paradoxes are: • The best militarily equipped modern dictatorship (the Soviet state) suffered a sudden collapse without much resistance (except for the amateurish coup d'état in August 1991); • A similar paradox is that one of the mightiest secret services in the world of Soviet state socialism, namely that of the GDR, the so called "Stasi", did not in any way resist disempowerment; • And lastly: the reformers from within state socialism disappeared almost without trace just after the systemic reforms they had long sought began. I am going to explore the last of these paradoxes in particular, about the disappearance of the reformers. I would like to concentrate, firstly, on some assumptions and explanations that are fundamental to my research: Different approaches to the nature of state socialism produce different results in relation to the topic of my interest-the influence reformers had on changing society in the 1970s and 1980s. Secondly, I will explain why it is important to search for the traces the reformers had left behind in late state socialism. Finally I explain two assumptions relating to the research I will conduct into the heritage of the reformers after 1989.
These reformers are usually interpreted in different ways: For several scholars they are nothing other than inconsistent fighters for liberal freedoms. Others see the reformers as mere opportunists that failed in their attempt to assume power in a deteriorating environment (see the case of the Polish reformers in Jasiewicz 2008). And I would like to prove my assumption that they were democrats by choice seeking participatory and social democracy driven by the aim of returning to true socialist utopia.
Two questions to answer: "What was socialism"? 5 And how did the reformers contribute to its peaceful end?
As Katherine Verdery has underlined, much of the present discussion on "real socialism" is still influenced by Cold War stereotypes: "As an organization of thought the Cold War affected both public perceptions and intellectual life..." (Verdery 1996, 4) One of the shadows cast by the Cold War stereotypes is found in the plausibility of the supposition that East European state socialism was nothing other than a harsh political dictatorship. Its Cold War image as a totalitarian autocracy is still widespread. 6 In my understanding, first of all, the term "totalitarian dictatorship" does not appropriately describe the functioning of socialism in its late period-that is from the beginning of the 1960s. János Kornai indicated that it was a "period of reforms" or of "perfecting" the system that followed the end of classical socialism after the death of Stalin. 7 The totalitarian explanatory model is not able to explain most of the changes within state socialism; it fails to explain the peaceful end of the order; it is unable to account for the political role of the sub-elite or the "service class" ("Dienstklasse" in German). 8 Secondly, there is another, very different, interpretation of the late socialist societies in which reformers again do not play an important role in the changes. I have in mind the sociocultural and linguistic approaches of Alexei Yurchak. He has distinguished his own position clearly from the totalitarian approach. But due to his conception of change the reformers are again ignored. That conceptual deficit is caused by his discourse analysis approach. Late socialism, he believes, was shaped mainly by the authoritative discourse. He regards the reformers as "activists" who took the official discourse at face value. Activists and dissidents were pictured as people who were marginalized and could not influence the changes in late socialism. Yurchak thereby mainly emphasized the de-ideologization of the official (authoritative) discourse. Both the "activists" and the "dissidents" are characterized as agents that do not notice this important "performative trend". They would act as if the former official ideology still mattered to somebody.
9
In the Yurchakian model of interpretation only the higher echelon of the party elite was able to change the authoritative discourse. Gorbachev was a decisive actor who brought the system to its end (Yurchak 2005, 292 ff). From my point of view, however, over the years the middle range reformers exerted much more influence on the changing interpretations of politics and society and they also influenced the changes in "authoritative discourse" as a whole in late socialism.
To a third conception: State-socialism is in my opinion better described as an (at least, partly successful) attempt to modernize backward societies (Berend 1998; Segert 2002) . The political power apparatus in this regard turns out to have been an instrument of these processes of modernization. Its functionality could be measured by the level of success of the modernizing policies. Using this model of interpretation one is at least able to explain some important changes in the economy, habitat, social structures, and education in countries like Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. The 1960s reforms were propelled by the assessment that the actual output of the planned economy had fallen short of expectations. It was not only power and ideology; economic output also mattered 7 The concept of totalitarianism fits better with the 1930s and-as far as East Central Europe is concerned-roughly 10 years after 1947. But it is also true for this period of socialism that "totalitarian" was more the intention of communist politics than its actual result. Compare Järvinen (2010, 31) . 8 My concept of "service class" is different from that of John Goldthorpe (1980) mainly because my term relates only to the power structure (Segert 2009a) . The "service class" in the context of my paper is an intermediary stratum between the power elite and the "subjects", the bulk of the population. See also Brie (1996) and additionally Hofmann (1956) for a conception of the service class in state socialism. 9 Compare Yurchak's chapter "Activists, dissidents and svoi" (2005, 102-108). greatly in state socialism. The reforms were attempts to better meet the expectations of the leadership and the people. 10 Additionally, state socialism was an attempt to respond to some important problems that the capitalist liberal democracies were unable to resolve during the first half of the 20 th century. And it was one of several historical movements driven by the utopia of a just society. The reforms also aimed to bridge the gap between socialist utopia and the disappointing reality of state socialism. It is at this point especially that the so called "reform communists" enter the stage. And it is why these reformers have produced texts that remind the public and its comrades of the primary sense of the socialist program, of the original or of the young Marx.
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Gorbachev's first interpretation of perestroika was outlined in the motto: "Back to Lenin".
To sum up this part of the paper: the space accorded to reformers in the analyses depends greatly on the answer to the simple question "What was socialism?" Reform is unthinkable in the model of socialism as a totalitarian dictatorship. In this case the party leaders were able to control the whole society using terror, and ideological educational reform would simply not have been allowed.
Secondly, within the Yurchakian model of society there is neither place for reform nor for a change from within. The official behaviour of individuals is not reform oriented but conformist. Momentum for change in formal institutions could come only from above. The highest authority, the top party leader, is the only person who can change the formal rules and the authoritative discourse. Other reformers (from the "second rank" or the middle echelon of the party-state) disappear.
Thirdly, there is a concept of socialism as a path of modernization for backward societies, which is-at least partly-related to the utopia of a better society for the poor; in it crises and reforms are decisive spaces of change. Within these reforms the actors have clear agendas for change within the given power structures and the framework of the legitimizing ideology. In order to be successful the reformers must build a coalition that bridges different levels of power (see Segert 2002, 205-213; Segert 2009b) . 10 At the discussion on my lecture at the Aleksanteri Institute in 2011, Markku Kivinen raised some important objections against my argument (that state socialism was one way of modernizing a backward society). I was able to agree with some of them: there was not only progress in modernization but also a regression in different spheres, mainly in politics. And economic modernization is also questionable with regard to Soviet agriculture. Others should be a point of further discussion: Did modernization really occur in culture? Is it worth remembering only the attempt to homogenize society to erase a particular plurality? In my mind we should remember the actual order of things at that time, both in the region and in the West: In most of the countries the upper and upper-middle classes had privileged access to higher education before state socialism. Therefore the opening up of secondary schools and universities to children from lower classes was a very positive move for the respective societies. And another topic worth thinking about relates to the ideas behind the struggle to broaden employee participation at work, for example, during the 1960s and the 1980s. In my opinion these ideas could be beneficial to our present discussion on the further enhancement of democracy. The particular sequence of decisions taken during the economic reforms of Czechoslovakia in the early 1960s is as follows: At first there was a growing awareness among the leadership of the economic difficulties and a growing uncertainty of the dogmatists triggered by the 22nd KPSS party congress of 1961 and its ongoing criticism of Stalin. But, secondly, the engagement of the sub elite was important. Economists like Ota Šik led in preparing conceptions for reform of the state economy. Šik was appointed director of the Institute for the Economy at the Academy of Science in 1961. One year later he became a member of the Central Committee. He established a team to develop and promote a reform program. That program was finalized by the leadership in 1965. The following year work started on implementing it. During the Prague Spring it was accompanied by political measures, first of all by worker councils that were to supervise management at the enterprise level. Part of the reform included the decentralization and democratization of economic planning. Ota Šik was acting deputy prime minister from April until September 1968. The reform was abandoned after the country was occupied by troops from five Warsaw Treaty states in August 1968.
Similar reform attempts took place in nearly all European state socialist countries at different times and resulted in varying degrees of change. They left their mark on the respective societies and fostered the liberalization and even humanization of the countries to different degrees. They also led to greater consideration of consumer interests and eventually influenced post socialist developments (Compare, for instance, Ekiert 1996) .
In relation to the reforms during the second half of the 1980s, there is another phenomenon that has to be explained: the non-violent end of the power of the communist state parties. At the beginning I pointed out the paradox that the heavily armed Soviet state and the mighty GDR-secret services did not seriously resist disempowerment at the end. Often systemic change is defined by the strenuous fight put up by dissidents or by the population rioting. But this is not the only way to understand systemic change.
Archie Brown made the point that the decisions made by the reformer Gorbachev (and not those taken in dissident circles) were of prime importance for the peaceful end of Soviet communism. I will not go into more detail, but highlight one argument only: Gorbachev was convinced that the deformed state socialism could be remolded to its original format and-in his own conviction-the only true path to socialist transformation (Brown 1996) . Gorbachev believed in "learning by doing"-his aims changed over time; once a Leninist believer, he became a convinced social democrat.
Many consequences of the changes at the end of the 1980s were unintended and surprised the decision makers later on. It is well known that this was the case in Poland after the Round Table talks. Neither dissidents nor state party reformers were well prepared for the results of the June 1989 elections.
A final argument reads as following: Walter Süß, who analyzed the last year of the East German secret police (Süß 1999) , argued that the loss of consensus over political tasks between the rank and file of the party and its leadership was most important for the unexpected non-use of force by the secret police in autumn 1989. The author believes that relations between informers and their case officers from the ministry for state security were particularly important for these political relations.
My own argument published in an article in Debatte (Segert 2009c) follows the same line. Since the intelligentsia occupied a central place within the service class of state socialism, when the reform-minded groups of the East German intelligentsia broke the consensus it noticeably influenced the attitudes of the power elite during autumn 1989 (the "Wende").
There were several other actors involved in the evolving and revolutionary East European changes from the mid-1980s onwards as well: tiny groups of dissidents in all countries, social movements (mainly in Poland), emigrants from different countries (mainly the GDR but also Bulgaria and Albania), street protestors (the Czech Republic, Romania, and again in the GDR), and strike movements (Poland and the Soviet Union). But the reformers with their far-reaching programs and illusions were a crucial part of this spectrum. It was not only the large number of reform-minded members of the state parties that mattered.
From outside the changes in Eastern Europe have been interpreted as an interconnected chain of events driven by a domino effect. That is partly true and was caused by the crisis of legitimization that struck the whole system at the end of the 1980s. But in order to understand the mechanism of change better one should analyze the differences between the various countries in more detail: in some countries reforms from above played a more central role in systemic change, in others there were negotiated power transfers, and in yet others pressure from below was more important.
The reformers from within the state parties were important in different ways: In some countries like in the Soviet Union or Bulgaria reformers from the top were the key figures at the start of the changes; in the Soviet Union there was also interaction between the reformers at the top and society (organized in the "neformaly", in NGOs). In Hungary reformers were the main driving force during the whole period of change until the first free elections. In all countries there were additionally triggers from society. In Hungary a plural opposition had been part of the political game since 1988. In some parties there were stronger rank-andfile-movements, during particular periods of change, like in the MSZMP 12 and the SED
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. In Poland there was more of an interconnected power play between several players. The party reformers confronted the hard liners and the moderates within Solidarność and the church, who were contested by radicals in the opposition camp and the church (See Hofmann 2011). And the whole systemic change of the Eastern Bloc was also influenced by mighty external forces: the USA, concerned about its presence in Europe and the future of NATO, West German elites and their counterparts in France and the UK, and so forth. (See Plato 2002) .
Enlargement of the West or post-socialism? What happens to the reformers after 1989/1991?
After 1989 the state socialist system had seemingly vanished into thin air. Astonishingly the old Polish joke became true: "What is socialism"? It is "the longest and most painful route from capitalism to capitalism".
14 The corresponding political science theory was called "transition to democracy". The main assumption behind this theoretical construct is that there was only one aim in transforming state socialism, namely: The East will become a cookie-cutter copy of the West. It was thought that the whole of Europe would become an identical economic and political order: a free market economy and a liberal democracy.
15 If this theoretical assumption were true there would have been only one part for the former state party reformers to play: They would have had to change radically and transform themselves from true socialists to true liberal democrats and free market admirers. That would have been a kind of suicide followed by a resurrection.
On many points, the concept of "post-socialism" runs contrary to the understanding that it is an "Eastern enlargement of the West". Verdery posed some very important questions early on in her book "What was socialism and what comes next?" First of all it is important to stress her premise that the terms stemming from the cultures and societies of the West are not sufficiently capable of explaining the changes in post-socialist Eastern European reality. In order to grasp the situation more deeply we require an "ethnographic sensitivity to the particulars of what is emerging" from-what she refers to as-"the ruins of socialism" (Verdery 1996, 10) .
Nevertheless there are some difficulties in searching for state-socialist reformers and the way in which they changed during "post-socialism". Their whole meaning-horizon was vanishing as the regime they believed in and saw as simply a hurdle on the way to a better or even the best society came to an end. What made it difficult for them to radically change their aims? Were the reformers prepared to take part in a very different political game? How are they dealing with the enormous loss of sense? What are the different paths of change?
The first premise is that the reformers were moving in four quite different directions of change after "1989" (in quotation marks)
:

A) From reformers to career politicians:
Some reformers from the top and from the intelligentsia within the sub-elite were engaged in transforming the authoritarian state-party into a normal party engaged in democratic contest for power. In some countries, like Poland and Hungary, they had already started tackling this during the last two years of state socialism. These reformers successfully sought a new image for the party once the old one-the brightness of a communist societyhad become obsolete. They found this new image in the programs and symbols of European Social Democracy. The paradox is that the former socialist reformers did not in fact change into traditional social democrats but neoliberals. This very important point has to do with changes that had been occurring in the West since the end of the 1970s, taking it towards a post-industrial and post-Keynesian order, and the shift of social democracy in the West towards neoliberal economic concepts. 15 See the conception and its critics Carothers 2002 , Merkel 2007 In this case "1989" does not indicate a precise time but the point of no return within systemic change. In some state (mainly in South Eastern Europe) the point of no return was later than in 1989. In these cases the reformers were still engaged with tasks that had already been resolved in other countries in that time.
My supposition concerning the ease 17 with which the former reformers became neoliberals consists in the following argument: they were eager to learn their lesson from the last defeat; namely, that the state and the state administration which had been the main instruments of transformation within the previous framework would now have to retreat radically. This lesson made them much more receptive to the neoliberal programs of advisers from Western social democratic parties and international financial institutions. In my opinion this was not so much opportunism but more a genuine attempt to learn from defeat. Some may have seen their neoliberal politics as simply a tactical move in a time of crisis. (Compare Ágh 2000, 304) .
B) Backslide from reformers to traditionalist "old left":
Other reformers were unable to secede from their antediluvian convictions. All over Eastern Europe either tiny communist splinter parties with traditionalist programs or alternative factions within the new social democratic parties began to emerge from the state parties. The Hungarian case is a good example of the first. When reformers at the top and from the reform circles dissolved the MSZMP state-party in October 1989 and founded the renewed "Hungarian Socialist Party" in the autumn of 1989, some of the party elite and members re-founded the old MSZMP. Later on the party was twice renamed and is now the "Hungarian Communist Workers Party" (Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt/MKMP). An example of the alternative way is the current Linkspartei (the Left Party) in Germany. After renaming the SED first as SED-PDS, then as PDS, in summer 2007, the tradionalists that remained within the party founded the "Communist Platform". Some well-known academics created the Marxist Forum some time later.
The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) remained independent but not insubstantial. This traditionalist party (Handl 2002) still has a large number of members and lasting electoral successes. In 2010 it received 11 percent of the votes. The Russian communists (KPRF) were similarly strong displaying much greater electoral strength in the second half of the 1990s.
C) Reformers moving towards the "New Left":
From the late 1960s onwards there emerged a "New" Left in the West and the Social Democrats, Communists, and the Workers Unions began to decline steadily and irreversibly. In many countries the "New Left" is organized into social and ecological movements. In some countries "Green Parties" entered parliament. After "1989" some former state socialist reformers reoriented towards this "New Left" in the West.
There had already been a certain amount of exchange before 1989: Regardless of the fact that the Western new left forces mainly cooperated with noncommunist dissidents from the East, state socialist reformers started to discuss the work and ideas of the new left as well.
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The "New Left" oriented forces in the East belonged to umbrella opposition parties at the dawn of transformation after 1989. Only rarely were they able to form independent parliamentary parties (for example Hungarian SZDSZ and FIDESZ in the first elections). At present Green parties are successful in some countries-mainly in Hungary, in (the East of) Germany, and Latvia. There were other Green parties in parliament in the Czech Republic and in Estonia. Another kind of new left party was the "Labor Union" (Unia Prace/UP) in Poland. UP was formed by left leaning followers of Solidarność, and some reformers from the former PZPR state party.
D) Retreat from political engagement:
There is also a fourth possibility. State socialist society was in a certain sense a highly politicized order. Firstly, it was characterized by a multitude of political rituals; secondly, the particular kind of power exercised continually generated new political conflicts at all levels everywhere. As Yurchak pointed out the reformers were "activists" who took the authoritative discourse seriously. Therefore they may have experienced the end of this highly politicized order as a personal release. Some of them may have used it as a retreat from political engagement into other spheres of activity. They had become entrepreneurs, engaged academics, or artists. In this sense a great number of the former reformers became invisible in terms of post "1989" political participation.
But because of their former deep interest in the state of the polity they are potentially the subject of future mobilizations. Every political community needs citizens who are interested in more than just private affairs. Among these potential political activists of democratic participation we find both ex-dissidents and former state-socialist reformers. The reformers were democrats by choice, who had sought both participatory and social democracy (driven by a belief in a socialist utopia) before 1989. Given that the post-socialist societies need to broaden democratic quality and expand social inclusion, the old ideals could become a driving force further engaging them in the "common cause".
Secondly, a final brief thesis concerns whether it could be useful from the perspective of political science to look for the paths reformers took from state socialism to post-socialism. Political science has to contribute to an understanding of present-day politics. The present state of politics is better explained from the model of post-socialism than from the "transition 18 There were also "state-socialist reformers" who had adopted new left issues before 1989, like Rudolf Bahro or Wolfgang Harich from the GDR. Both were known dissidents and critical Marxists, In 1977 Bahro published the book "Die Alternative" [The Alternative in Eastern Europe] (London: Verso 1981), The GDR sentenced him to eight years in prison but has amnestied him one years later and deported him to the Federal Republic of Germany. Harich was a Marxist philosopher who criticized Stalinism. In 1956 he wrote a SED-intern manifesto on the German unification. He was sentenced for by the GDR-state to eight years in prison for the "establishment of a conspirational counter-revolutionary group." After his release from prison in 1964 he remained in GDR and wrote books on Jean Paul and a manifesto on an ecologic socialism (Kommunismus ohne Wachstum [Communism without growth]).
to democracy" paradigm. In this case the very conception channels observations and enables us to concentrate on the agents and the way they continue despite the seemingly clear break with the past. Post socialism is not built from scratch. It is a process of intense personal and organizational learning by groups of people and individuals who were concerned with the common good in the past and continue to be so under radically changed circumstances.
We should deal with this using different groups of people, mainly three kinds of people: (1) dissidents, (2) reformers, and (3) ordinary people. The latter are explored in Nostalgia studies. The history of the dissidents before 1989 has already been comprehensively analyzed, at least in terms of those that agreed to strive for a "free market and liberal democracy after 1989". However, the minority of other former dissidents that insisted even after 1989 on a path to modernity other than neoliberal capitalism feature less in the research focus. 19 The other group of post socialist agents, the state-socialist reformers, also suffers from a lack of study. It was difficult for them to change because of the completely changing meaning-horizon. But it was possible to maintain some former findings and convictions. There are various reasons for this and one is that the state socialist order, even in its deformed version of Soviet state socialism, was, like democratic capitalism, a modern society and a child of the European Enlightenment. Which path the reformers took after 1989 and what they learnt from it is the subject of my next piece of research on this topic.
